Abstract. The extensive scholarship on 'varieties of capitalism' offers some conceptual and theoretical innovations that can be fruitfully employed to analyze the distinctive institutional foundations of capitalism in Latin America or what could be called hierarchical market economies (HMEs). This perspective helps identify four core features of HMEs in Latin America that structure business access to essential inputs of capital, technology, and labor: 1) diversified business groups, 2) multinational corporations (MNCs), 3) low-skilled labor, and 4) atomistic labor relations. Overall non-market, hierarchical relations in business groups and MNCs are central in organizing capital and technology, and are also pervasive in labor market regulation, union representation, and employment relations. Important complementarities exist among these features especially between MNCs and diversified business groups, as well as mutually reinforcing tendencies between these forms of corporate governance and general under investment in skills and in well mediated employment relations. These four features of HMEs, their common reliance on hierarchy, and the particular interactions among them add up to a distinct variety of capitalism, different from those identified in developed countries and other developing regions.
I. Introduction

1
The comparative institutional analysis of different varieties of capitalism has been elaborated extensively for some developed countries, especially the "liberal market economies" (LMEs) in the United States, United Kingdom, and other Anglophone countries and "coordinated market economies" (CMEs) in Germany, Japan, and other northern European countries. 2 In recent years scholars of other areas, especially Asia, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe have been asking whether distinctive varieties of capitalism exist in these regions as well (for example, see Amable 2003; Hancké, Rhodes, et al. 2007; Lane and Myant 2007) . Although the comparative institutional analysis of capitalism has a long tradition in Latin America, new research has been sparse. Beyond helping to revive this tradition, a 'varieties of capitalism' perspective would bring several major innovations to the study of Latin American political economy. Most importantly it incorporates labor relations and worker training into analyses of overall capitalist coordination; it shifts attention from states to firms; and it directs the empirical focus away from recent policy changes toward enduring, underlying institutional features of capitalism in the region.
The study of distinctive forms of capitalism in Latin America went through several stages over past decades, before slipping down the list of research priorities. Early analyses began with the assumption that entrepreneurs drove capitalist development, studied the behavior and attitudes of Latin American capitalists, and usually concluded that business people were insufficiently entrepreneurial (see for example Lauterbach 1965) . In the 1960s and 1970s this focus on individuals in a domestic setting shifted to a preoccupation with structures in the international ------------------------------------economy, namely dependency theory. Here the problem with Latin American capitalism was that it was dependent, externally constrained, and lacked internal dynamism. By the 1980s, the analysis of Latin American capitalism shifted again mostly toward the analysis of states and state intervention in the economy (Evans 1995) and later to changing development strategies (Haggard and Kaufman 1995) .
These successive literatures highlighted crucial aspects of capitalism in Latin America but also left important gaps. First, they had little to say about distinctive forms of corporate governance in domestic firms. We know a good deal about the political activities of domestic business, and its relations with government and MNCs, but much less about how local capitalists built and organized their firms. 3 The firm's-eye view of the world characteristic of 'variety of capitalism' analyses offers a useful corrective to other perspectives that either deduce firm behavior or treat it as secondary and mechanically reactive to other forces. And, in practice, what has emerged in developing countries in the wake of market-oriented reforms of the 1980s and 1990s is neither state-led nor market-led development but rather business-led development.
Second, and similarly, the large literature on organized labor focuses more on its role in politics than in collective bargaining and firm-level intermediation. Lastly, the study of worker skills, education, and training in Latin America has been largely left to a small group of policy experts, and the narrow literature on skills is rarely incorporated into general discussions of the performance of Latin American capitalism overall (Ducci 2001) . A 'varieties of capitalism' approach directs attention precisely to these neglected areas and interactions among them.
The goals of this paper are several. Conceptually and theoretically, the goal is to extend the debate on varieties of capitalism beyond the narrow confines of developed countries and to consider the benefits of employing conceptual innovations like the analysis of institutional complementarities to illuminate continuities in developing regions like Latin America. This analytic lens helps to generate hypotheses on the contours of a distinct variety of capitalism, a -3 -
------------------------------------
hierarchical market economy (HME), that seems to characterize well most large countries of Latin America.
Following the 'varieties' focus on corporate governance and labor relations, the four core 
II. Core Features of Hierarchical Market Capitalism in Latin America
An inductive survey of corporate governance and the organization of production in the larger countries of Latin America over the past half century reveals four enduring features:
diversified business groups, MNCs, atomistic labor and employee relations, and low-skilled labor.
The four core features of HMEs cover much of the ground that Hall and Soskice examine in their five spheres of strategic relationships: industrial relations; vocational education and training; corporate governance; inter-firm relations; and employee relations. In these generic spheres in HMEs, hierarchy often replaces or attenuates the coordinated or market relations found elsewhere. For example, whereas post-secondary or on-the-job training is more market based in LMEs and more negotiated in CMEs, it is often unilaterally decided by firms or business associations in Latin America. Such hierarchical relations also characterize more general (Garrido and Peres 1998, 13) . A rare comparative study of the five largest grupos in eight countries of Latin America found that 34 of 40 grupos had diversified into 4 or 5 different sectors (out of five total: primary, manufacturing, construction, services, and finance) (Durand 1996, 93) .
Contrary to expectations of convergence, diversified business groups survived and prospered through the liberalization and globalization of the 1990s and 2000s (Schneider 2008b (Schneider 2008b, see also La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1999, 492, 494 ). Venezuela (Cunningham 1986 , 46 citing Jenkins 1984 . The percentages were usually higher in sectors like chemicals, electrical equipment, and transport equipment than in consumer nondurables like food, beverages, textiles, and clothing. By 1995, by another calculation, the stock of FDI as a percentage of GDP was on average 16 percent for the four largest countries of Latin America (compared to 2 percent for Korea and 10 percent for Thailand (Guillén 2001, 126) ). In terms of coordinating functions, MNCs administered in hierarchical fashion technology transfer, capital for investment, some relations with suppliers and customers, and especially trade.
-8 -Although difficult to measure precisely, estimates of intra-firm trade between Latin America and the United States vary between one third and two thirds (Petras and Veltmeyer 1999; Zeile 1997 ).
Although the patterns are similar for other regions, it is important to note that this trade is not a market exchange between independent buyers and sellers, but more a shipping order between members of the same corporate organization. In addition, though not formally owned by MNCs, many export firms in Latin America are dependent on one or two international buyers in closely linked global commodity chains in which the inter-firm relationship is more vertical than horizontal (Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon 2005) . In sum, on the side of corporate governance, diversified business groups and MNCs were the key conduits for organizing access to capital, technology, and markets through Coasian internalization and hierarchy.
-9 -
. Atomistic employee and labor relations. 7 Labor relations in Latin America are atomistic and often anomic because workers have fluid, short-term links to firms, and weak or no horizontal links to other workers through labor unions. Among other things, worker turnover is high, few countries in the region have any special institutions (like co-determination) for micro coordination within firms, and "organized labor . . . is extremely weak" (Huber 2002, 458-9) . As a result, labor and employment relations are individualized, disintermediated, and consequently hierarchical (as employees have little leverage in relations with employers). between workers and employers. Lastly, many people work in the informal sector without unions or legal protections. Labor market regulations, on the books, are surprisingly more extensive on average in Latin America than in LMEs or even CMEs. However, the de facto reach of these regulations is limited because they do not cover the large informal sector and compliance in the formal sector is uneven at best (for example, see Berg 2005 ).
-10 - Compared to labor unions in much of the developed world, organized labor in Latin America tended to be more politicized and state controlled, and less effective at collective bargaining or ongoing intermediation at the plant and firm levels (Cook 2007) . The unionization rate was relatively high in some countries in the mid 20th century, especially in concentrated industries like mining and capital-intensive manufacturing, but it declined thereafter. By some estimates unionization among wage earners fell over the 1990s from 67 to 39 percent in Argentina, from 60 to 43 percent in Mexico, and from 18 to 5 percent in Peru (Marshall 2000, 12) . 8 Even where unionization rates were high (sometimes due to compulsory membership), unions were not necessarily a useful institutional vehicle for coordination between workers and employers, due largely to political and state intervention. States intervened both structurally in the sense of legislating levels and conditions of bargaining, and on an ad hoc basis through labor courts or direct intervention, so that both employers and union leaders often had stronger incentives to pursue their interests politically, with state actors, than with each other (see Buchanan 1995; French 2004) . In Chile, for example, labor statutes imposed by the Pinochet dictatorship prohibit multi-union confederations from collective bargaining and thereby encourage them to engage in broader political activities rather than more concrete problem solving and ongoing dialogue with employers, as is common in CMEs. Labor statutes also forbid company unions from negotiating on anything but wages, thereby precluding precisely the kinds of discussions over work organization, working time, training, and other issues that are at the heart of plant level relations in CMEs (Berg 2005; Sehnbruch 2006; Haagh 2002) .
In some respects the high turnover, combined with weak unions and limited regulation (as in the informal sector) would all seem to infuse markets into labor relations. And, many employment relations were like short-term spot transactions in open markets. However, most of these factors also shifted the balance of power in favor of employers and gave them more hierarchical control than is common in LMEs. For instance, translated into day to day relations, high turnover means that workers are almost always subject to dismissal, thereby enhancing employer leverage. Moreover, the absence of unions and weak enforcement of legal protections make workers even more vulnerable, and this vulnerability is even higher in the informal sector where workers by definition lack protection and representation. What explains the low levels of investment in skills? The lack of spontaneous firm investment is the common result of free riding; if one firm invests in training workers other firms can then poach and hire away the trained workers, so rational firms do not invest in training in the first place. This is a generic coordination problem faced by all political economies, overcome, when it is overcome, by either public provision or third-party enforcement of private provision.
The further questions for Latin America are why incentives for public provision and individual investment in education and training are weak. For a fuller answers to these questions, as well as a deeper understanding of why the other features persist, we need to look at complementarities among these features and reinforcing aspects of the broader context. Even in the absence of specific policies, MNCs sometimes preferred partnering with domestic groups in order to tap into political (rather than technical or managerial) expertise and capacity. -14 -
III. Compatibilities, Complementarities, and Resilience in HMEs
------------------------------------
9 In one recent survey of Latin America, "the most striking result [was] the low level of R&D conducted by firms" (de Ferranti, Perry, et al. 2003, 5) . 10 For instance, the directors of Banamex, the largest, and very diversified, bank in Mexico (until its nationalization in 1982) were on the boards of most important business associations, so any partner of Banamex would automatically gain crucial representation in Latin America have rarely exceeded the comparatively low level of .5 percent of GDP and over three quarters of that is public (Katz 2001, 4) . Even when they hire skilled workers, business groups do not hire very many. Overall, the IDB emphasized, "the low employment generation at of large Latin American companies" (IDB 2001, 36) . Moreover, MNCs pay higher, sometimes much higher, wages than local firms (Berg 2005) , so MNCs can easily poach skilled workers which reduces even further the incentives for domestic firms to invest in training.
MNCs for their part typically opted to invest in established product markets with stable technologies and predictable market demand (market seeking rather than efficiency seeking FDI The lasting, perverse complementarities of a low-skill trap or equilibrium are well known (Booth and Snower 1996) . The basic coordination problem is that workers do not invest individually in acquiring skills because firms do not offer high-skill, high wage jobs. Firms in turn have incentives to invest in production processes that do not require skilled labor because skilled workers are scarce. This low skill trap seems to hold strongly for Latin America (Schneider and Karcher 2008 ).
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Atomistic labor relations and low skills. When turnover is high and unions at the firm level are weak, then employers have even weaker incentives to invest in worker skills both because they expect them not to stay long and because they lack institutional means for negotiating with workers an explicit distribution of gains over time from investing in training. For workers, short tenure also limits their time horizons and lowers their interest in investing in firm specific skills, or even in sector specific skills if they move regularly among different sectors.
Among Chilean workers who changed jobs in the 1990s, over half switched from one sector to another (Sehnbruch 2006) . Moreover, the frequent movement of workers between formal and informal employment presumably involves shifting among sectors with different skill requirements. High turnover also reduces the incentives for both labor and management to improve plant-and firm-level intermediation (see Schneider and Karcher 2008) . The negative impact of high turnover on incentives for investing in skills and dialogue is one of the clearest complementarities among the components of HMEs.
Low skills and business groups. The absence of a large pool of skilled workers further discouraged domestic firms from investing in upgrading their production or in other higher technology sectors, and instead encouraged domestic firms to target lower technology investments where appropriate skills were abundant in the labor market. Studies in the United
States have shown that technology acquisition did not lead firms to upgrade training and skills, but rather firms that already had skilled workers invested more in new technologies (IDB 2003, 188) . Low technology investment coupled with high labor turnover may also facilitate diversification. That is, lower technology investment and the management of homogeneous flows of temporary, low-skilled workers can become elements of, and increase returns to, economies of scope. Once a firm develops a successful strategy for borrowing one technology and using it successfully with a flow of low-skilled workers, then the barriers for replicating this strategy in other sectors are lower (see Amsden 1989 ).
Hall and Soskice also expect that, "nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other spheres as well" -17 -(2001, 18) . Although they do not elaborate, the mechanisms promoting this isomorphism seem to differ between CMEs and LMEs. In CMEs, it is largely a positive function of learning: as economic agents realize joint gains from coordination in one sphere they will be more likely to replicate coordination into other realms. In LMEs, isomorphism seems to result more from managerial expectations and preferences. If relations in some spheres area are market based, then managers have incentives to press for flexibility in other spheres, or reasons to chafe at nonmarket constraints. A similar logic informs complementarities in HMEs. It is less that agents realize joint gains from hierarchy and agree to extend them to other spheres. Rather, hierarchy is the default preference, especially for state and business elites who have greater influence in initial institutional formation. Longer term complementarities and path dependence arise from the fact that hierarchies impede movement to either coordination or markets. Overall, these complementarities and weaker compatibilities contribute to the stickiness of the core features of
HMEs, but this resiliency is less the result of internal equilibrium and more resistance to exogenous pressures for change. Lastly, Latin America has long been a world leader in socioeconomic inequality which works in the contemporary period to reinforce hierarchies as well as thwart efforts to promote education and investment in human capital. Without resorting to more cultural interpretations of class divisions, it is nonetheless plausible to hypothesize that vast differences in education, norms, ethnicity, and sometimes gender and language create a gulf between workers and managers that makes both sides less eager to engage in coordination and negotiation. And, inequality reduces incentives on both sides for incremental investment in education and training, because the gap -19 -between actual and desired skills is so great. Perversely, in Latin America the returns to education are lowest for poor households (Perry, López, et al. 2005) .
12
In sum, numerous factors reinforce HMEs in Latin America. Some interactions, as in the low skill trap, represent strong (negative) complementarities. In other instances, hierarchy is more a default that is at least compatible with other hierarchical components. 13 Other contextual factors like state intervention and volatility tend to reinforce hierarchy and the four core components. Even without reinforcement, hierarchies have some inertia and create obstacles to coordination and markets that would require extraordinary effort or circumstances to overcome.
Yet, in all, it would be overstated to conclude that HMEs are in immutable equilibrium. Change is possible on a number of dimensions, including state reform, lessening volatility, and improving education, and might shift some of the HMEs of Latin America toward some other variety of capitalism. If so, then incremental movement towards markets may be easier than transition to coordination (Finegold and Soskice 1988) . Some aspects of HMEs --growing stock markets, for example --may gradually displace more hierarchical corporate governance. However, for the time being most large economies of Latin America are better characterized as HMEs, than emerging CMEs, LMEs, or other possible hybrids.
IV. Comparisons and Conclusions
My analysis has stressed commonalities among the larger countries of Latin America on the core features of HMEs, but there is of course wide variation across the region, and some countries deviate sufficiently from the mean to warrant consideration for separate classification.
-20 -
Venezuela's oil rents, for example, make it an outlier, especially in terms of the weight and role of the state in the economy. Venezuela still shared many HME features with other countries in the region such as low skills and large business groups, but analytically it may have more in common with other large petro-states like Indonesia and Russia in a variety of 'rentier market economy' (Karl 1997) . Oil and gas rents in Ecuador and Bolivia may be pushing their political economies in a similar direction.
Beyond the petro-states, the other countries of the region often diverge on one or another dimension from the mean, but not significantly or consistently enough to conclude that they do not fit the general HME framework. Moreover, countries that diverge on one dimension are often integration has yet to alter fundamentally the main HME features. The effect may also be transitory as outsourced manufacturing moves to Asia.
On the industrial relations dimension, collective bargaining experienced a surprising and broad based revival in Argentina in the 2000s to the point where a large majority of formal sector workers were covered (Etchemendy and Collier 2007) . Argentine business groups also declined precipitously as many of the largest moved or sold out to MNCs. However, given the volatility -21 -that has characterized the Argentine economy in recent decades, it is too soon to conclude that these dramatic swings of the past decade will end up as lasting institutional shifts.
Another change that affected most of the larger countries was a significant expansion in equity markets in the 2000s (Stallings 2006) . One hypothesis would be that the countries at the vanguard of this expansion, Chile and Brazil, would be trending toward LME forms of corporate governance. Although there are some signs of more dispersed ownership and greater participation by institutional investors, both foreign and domestic, nearly all companies in both countries still have controlling blockholders, in most cases families. Overall, though these variations --more of degree than kind --do not yet warrant excluding countries from the HME category, they do help identify potential sources of future change and movement away from HME complementarities towards other possible types of capitalism.
Outside Latin America, the core features of HMEs also seem prominent in some middle income countries of southeast Asia and possibly Turkey, but Latin America and East Asia, especially Taiwan and Korea, differ greatly along all four dimensions. East Asia had higher educational and skill levels, as noted earlier, and lower levels of FDI and socioeconomic inequality. The two regions also differed with respect to the presence of MNCs. In 1982, foreign affiliates of US and Japanese firms controlled 19 percent of manufacturing in Latin America versus 8 percent in East Asia (Amsden 2001, 209) . Diversified business groups dominate the domestic private sector in both regions, but Asian groups were more active in manufacturing and ultimately moved into higher technology sectors (Schneider 2009b) . Part of the explanation lies in the lack of MNCs that in Latin America boxed domestic firms out of higher technology sectors and in relatively less volatility of the kind that led business groups in Latin America to diversify out of manufacturing and into finance, services, and agriculture. A last difference is the stronger role in East Asia of business associations and other forms of inter-firm cooperation, usually enforced or subsidized by the state. Overall, despite some inter-regional similarities, countries like Korea and Taiwan differ significantly enough to exclude them from the HME category (and hypothesize that they may approximate more CMEs) (Schneider 2008a ). Although beyond the scope of this essay, the comparative institutional approach offers some hypotheses on these puzzles. For instance, both business groups and MNCs struggled initially when governments rolled back ISI protections. In most countries, new MNC investment initially gravitated out of manufacturing into services and raw materials, or to countries with better skills, lower wages, and closer proximity (like Mexico). Absolute flows of FDI into Latin America reached all time highs, but much of this investment went to acquire firms (some through large privatization programs) rather than new production. Most domestic business groups were able to survive and adjust to market reforms but did so mostly by exiting uncompetitive industries and expanding into non-tradable sectors and commodity exports. Reformers hoped that trade liberalization would rapidly increase overall trade, especially through higher value added exports.
However, outside the special case of post-Nafta Mexico, the proportion of higher technology exports did not expand in the 1990s (Baumann 2002, 59) . A possible explanation lies in a convergence of disincentives. MNCs often kept the higher technology parts of their commodity chains in developed countries or East Asia and had few incentives to move them to the low-skill (and often high-wage due to currency over valuations) economies in Latin America. Domestic -23 -business groups lacked core competencies based on proprietary technologies and hence had few incentives to bet heavily on specializing in particular sectors for export, except for natural resources and commodities.
In the wake of the commodity boom of the 2000s and the resumption of moderate growth in the region, the debate faded over what went wrong with the market reforms of the 1990s.
Most aspects of the new commodity-led development played to the relative strengths of HMEs.
MNCs and business groups were well positioned to expand commodity production. Many of the largest business groups such as Votorantim (aluminum and pulp and paper) in Brazil, Grupo
México (mining), and Luksic (mining) in Chile were concentrated in commodities prior to 2000, and some business groups, especially in Brazil and Mexico, leveraged commodity rents into aggressive expansion abroad. Hierarchical labor relations were not an obstacle to expansion; commodity production relies on fairly standard technologies and bonanza prices reduced pressures to improve efficiency, so managers and workers had few incentives to seek more institutionalized forms of coordination. As the commodity boom progressed, skill shortages did emerge in some sectors, but for the most part commodity production is very capital intensive and overall requires few workers, skilled or unskilled. In Chile, for example, the copper sector accounted for some 15 percent of GDP but employed less than two percent of the labor force. At the same time the commodity boom reduced pressures, as growth rates stabilized and currencies appreciated, to find higher skill niches in the global economy that could generate more and better employment. In sum, commodity led growth seems compatible with, and likely to reinforce, most features of HMEs.
Finally, on a more theoretical level, a focus on hierarchy facilitates the incorporation of factors like the state and MNCs that have been so prevalent in most late developers yet so absent in most analyses of varieties of capitalism (see Hancké, Rhodes, et al. 2007) . While a firm's eye view has some advantages over earlier statist perspectives, the state is rarely out of sight in Latin
America. In addition, elements of hierarchy in several spheres of the economy, especially labor markets, are directly or indirectly reinforced by states. In terms of international influences, when -24 -scholars invoke globalization, they often have in mind integrated markets for goods, services, and especially finance, or the geographical contraction resulting from the spread of new information and communication technologies. These factors have had profound effects on developing economies, but for most people, especially workers, the palpable face of globalization is the MNCs that organize, hierarchically, so much of employment, investment, and technology transfer.
One of the neglected ironies of liberalization in the 1990s is that market oriented reforms in trade, privatization, and deregulation often resulted, in the end, in more hierarchy than market.
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